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INTRODUCTION 
Times Square in New York City is an unusual venue to expound complex 
international legal issues. The countless illuminated billboards of this tourist 
spot usually advertise Broadway productions, sugary soft drinks, or the latest 
must-have smartphone. Between July 23 and August 3, 2016, however, a three-
minute clip by Xinhua, the Chinese State news agency, was shown 120 times a 
day on one of the giant screens of 2 Times Square.1 Picturesque images of 
fishing boats and islets were captioned with commentary describing the Chinese 
discovery of the South China Sea Islands over two millennia ago, and their 
 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z389882N33 
* Dr. iur., M.A., M.Phil, Lecturer, University of Zurich; Senior Research Fellow, Centre for 
Democracy, University of Zurich. I would like to thank the Organizing Committee of the 2017 ILA-
ASIL Asia-Pacific Research Forum, where an early draft of this paper was presented. I am also 
indebted to Professors Oliver Diggelmann, Andreas Glaser, Daniel Moeckli, Andreas Th. Müller and 
Matthias Oesch, who provided valuable comments, and to Teresa Kam.  
1 Niu Yue, South China Sea Plays in Times Square, CHINA DAILY (July 27, 2016), 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-07/27/content_26246467.htm.   
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subsequent exclusive exploration and exploitation.2 Rather abruptly, however, 
the subject changed. The video denounced the vain attempts “of the Arbitral 
Tribunal … to deny China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and 
interests”.3 China, it stated, “did not participate in the illegal South China Sea 
arbitration, nor accepts the Award so as to defend the solemnity of international 
law.”4 Chinese officials and foreign politicians, diplomats, and observers then 
elaborated upon these statements, stressing that China was the “only true owner” 
of the South China Sea Islands, and advocating for a grown-up approach to 
dialogue by pressing for negotiations between the States directly concerned.5 
If passing tourists noticed the display at all, the historical résumé 
presumably left most of them perplexed—Chinese assurances to the contrary 
notwithstanding.6 Nor is it likely that the vague allusions to an unspecified 
arbitral award were readily grasped by visitors hunting for discounted musical 
tickets. Still, Chinese spectators in particular might have understood the 
reference to the final award in the South China Sea Arbitration between the 
Philippines and China before a tribunal established at the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration in The Hague (the Award). Two weeks previously, on July 12, 2016, 
this tribunal adopted the Award, ruling unanimously that the conduct of China in 
the South China Sea was incompatible with several provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, or, the Convention).7 The 
arbitration proceedings were initiated in 2013 by the Philippines under the 
compulsory dispute settlement procedure provided for by the Convention.8 The 
Philippines had submitted, inter alia, that the seabed and the maritime features 
of the South China Sea were governed by UNCLOS and that, as a consequence, 
Chinese claims based on “historic rights” within the area encompassed by the 
so-called “nine-dash line” were invalid.9 In addition, the Philippines had argued 
 
2 China Review Studio, A Short Video on Times Square, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2016), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XI2s-2vjr7o. The video is also available, inter alia, at 
http://www.cantab.net/users/langer/SCS.mp4. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 South China Sea Video Draws Huge Response in Times Square, CHINA DAILY (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-07/27/content_26239494.htm; cf. Stuart Leavenworth, 
China's Times Square Propaganda Video Accused of Skewing Views of British MP, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/31/chinas-times-square-propaganda-
video-accused-of-skewing-views-of-british-mp (reporting that Catherine West, the MP in question, 
had not been informed about the use of her statements in the film, and that she was in fact concerned 
about Chinese policies in the South China Sea; also, she had been identified incorrectly as “Shadow 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the British Labour Party”(supra note 3).  
6 See South China Sea Video Draws Huge Response in Times Square, supra note 5 (claiming that the 
video “has appealed to a massive number of people who stop by and watch”). 
7 South China Sea Arbitration Award (Phil. v. China), 2013-19 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2016) [hereinafter 
South China Sea Arbitration (Award)]. 
8 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, arts. 286–287, Annex VII art. 1, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 396 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
9 South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, ¶¶ 112(B)(2) and 192. On the nine-dash line, 
BJIL_36-3_ARTICLE 2_LANGER  
2018] SOUTH CHINA SEA 385 
that certain maritime features in the South China Sea were mere rocks or low-
tide elevations and therefore not entitled to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
or to territorial waters respectively.10 The Philippines also claimed that its own 
EEZ had been violated, and that Chinese reclamation and construction activities 
on some reefs violated UNCLOS provisions on artificial islands and on the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.11 China, which had 
neither recognized the Tribunal’s jurisdiction nor participated in the 
proceedings, rejected the ruling as “null and void.”12 
The South China Sea Arbitration has set out the maritime legal questions in 
the South China Sea in great detail—combined, the Awards on jurisdiction and 
the merits run to over 650 pages.13 The technicalities of these questions have 
also been extensively analyzed by legal scholars, both prior to the final Award 
and in its wake.14 In this paper, however, the arbitration proceedings provide 
merely a starting point; rather than focusing on jurisdictional intricacies, 
maritime zones, or low-tide elevations, I intend to use the South China Sea as a 
paradigm for the challenges that face not only international law as a normative 
order, but also international legal scholarship.  
While the arbitral Award itself will not be analyzed in this article, Part II 
illustrates that the Award’s aftermath provides insights into the respective 
attitudes of the States involved with regard to dispute settlement. The conflict in 
the South China Sea also has considerable implications for the law of the sea, 
 
see infra, note 22 and accompanying text.  
10 South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, at ¶¶ 112(B)(3,4,6-7), 291–297 and 408–445; 
cf. UNCLOS arts. 121(3) and 13(2). 
11 For the final submissions, see South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, ¶ 112. 
12 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Statement on the Award of 12 July 2016 
of the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea Arbitration Established at the Request of the 
Republic of the Philippines (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1379492.htm. 
13 S. China Sea Arbitration (Phil. v. China) – Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 2013-19 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction)]; South China Sea 
Arbitration (Award), supra note 7. 
14 On jurisdiction, see 1/2013 AM. J. INT’L. L. and 2/2016 CHIN. J. INT’L. L. (infra notes 223 & 224); 
Robert Beckman, UNCLOS Part XV and the South China Sea, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES 
AND LAW OF THE SEA 229–64 (Shunmugam Jayakumar, Tommy Koh & Robert Beckman eds., 
2014); THE SOUTH CHINA SEA ARBITRATION: A CHINESE PERSPECTIVE (Stefan Talmon & Bing 
Bing Jia eds., 2014); Diane A. Desierto, The Jurisdictional Rubicon: Scrutinizing China’s Position 
Paper on the South China Sea Arbitration – Part I, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L.(Jan. 29, 2015), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-jurisdictional-rubicon-scrutinizing-chinas-position-paper-on-the-south-
china-sea-arbitration/; The Jurisdictional Rubicon: Scrutinizing China’s Position Paper on the South 
China Sea Arbitration – Part II, BLOG EUR. J. INT’L L. (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-
jurisdictional-rubicon-scrutinizing-chinas-position-paper-on-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-part-ii/; 
John E. Noyes, In re Arbitration Between the Philippines and China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 102–08 
(2016); Anthony Carty, The South China Sea Disputes Are Not Yet Justiciable, in ARBITRATION 
CONCERNING THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: PHILIPPINES VERSUS CHINA, 23–54 (Shicun Wu & Keyuan 
Zou eds., 2016). On the merits, see Lucy Reed & Kenneth Wong, Marine Entitlements in the South 
China Sea: The Arbitration between the Philippines and China, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 152–58 (2016); 
French Duncan, In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration, 19 ENVTL L. REV. 48–56 (2017).  
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positing demands for traditional freedom of navigation against more recent 
efforts to establish sovereign rights over ever larger maritime areas, as 
demonstrated in Part III.A. More importantly, and beyond the law of the sea, 
Part III.B sets out how the conflict in the South China Sea threatens the 
safeguarding of peace as one of the main tasks of international law. In Part IV, I 
argue that these developments should serve as a cautionary contrast to the 
prevailing narrative of international law as a progressively successful normative 
order. According to that narrative, international law is overcoming its traditional 
limitations and the primacy of State sovereignty. I will analyze two such claims 
of progress in some detail: in Part IV.A, the gradual process of 
deterritorialization will be addressed, while Part IV.B considers the advancing 
constitutionalization of international law. While such concepts have their merits, 
the South China Sea exposes the (considerable) limitations that they are still 
subject to. Finally, the conflict over shoals, rocks, and reefs also serves as a 
reminder of the important, yet rarely impugned role(s) that individual scholars of 
international law play—not only as proponents of legal theories or participants 
in abstract scholarly discourse, but also as active advocates of parochial national 
interests. In Part V, we will see that such advocacy is not restricted to the forum, 
but extends well into supposedly impartial scholarly output.  
I. 
THE ARBITRATION AWARD AND ITS AFTERMATH 
The South China Sea encompasses an area of circa 3.5 million square 
kilometers, or 648,000 square nautical miles; it abuts on the coasts of China, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines, and Indonesia.15 These 
waters are of eminent strategic and economic importance. Some of the busiest 
international sea lanes pass through the Sea, carrying approximately 5 trillion 
USD worth of shipping trade each year—more than half the world’s annual 
merchant fleet tonnage.16 Its grounds account for 10 percent of the global annual 
fishing catch and are thought to contain considerable oil and natural gas 
reserves.17 
Competition for control of these assets has already resulted in armed 
clashes between some of the coastal States, mostly over control of the islands, 
islets, reefs, atolls, and sandbanks that are scattered throughout the South China 
 
15 See John R. V. Prescott & Clive H. Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World 
429 (2d ed. 2005). An illustrative map is provided by the South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction), 
supra note 13, at 3, Figure 1.  
16 "You May Have Incidents": Singapore’s Defence Minister Warns Non-military Vessels in South 
China Sea Create "Uncertainty", S. CHINA MORNING POST, (Oct. 3, 2016) 
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/diplomacy/article/2024548/you-may-have-incidents-singapores-
defence-minister-warns-non; C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy, Introduction, in The South China 
Sea, 1, 1 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy eds., 2016). 
17 INT’L CRISIS GROUP, Stirring up the South China Sea (I) (Apr. 23, 2012). 
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Sea, and over the Spratly and Paracel Islands in particular.18 Under the regime 
provided for by UNCLOS, the coastal States have submitted extensive claims to 
these riches as territorial or archipelagic waters, EEZs, as well as continental 
shelves.19 Claims to a continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles have to be 
submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf established 
under UNCLOS, which will then issue recommendations; the limits of the shelf 
that are subsequently established by the coastal State on the basis of the 
Commission's recommendations are final and binding.20 In response to 
Vietnamese and Malaysian claims submitted to the Commission, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC, or, China) invoked the so-called nine-dash line for the 
first time on the international level.21 This line was conceived in 1936 and thus 
predates Communist rule in China.22 The area enclosed encompasses 
approximately 2 million square kilometers, or the equivalent of 22 percent of 
China’s land area; it includes the Spratly and Paracel Islands as well as 
Scarborough Shoal.23 Originally, the various rocks, islets, and shoals comprised 
circa 15 square kilometers of dry land.24 Starting in 2012, however, the PRC 
embarked on a large-scale reclamation project, which has almost doubled the 
land area in the South China Sea.25  
As mentioned above, the Philippines contested the legality of both the 
extensive claims under the nine-dash line and the land reclamation before the 
arbitral tribunal.26 China officially refused to participate in the arbitral 
proceedings, but nevertheless went to great lengths to make sure its position and 
its arguments were known. First, China used academic surrogates to advance its 
 
18 Armed skirmishes between the PRC and Vietnam took place in 1974 in the Paracel Islands; in 
1988 a naval battle in the Spratly Islands was sparked by the Chinese construction of a maritime 
station on Fiery Cross Reef. Tensions between the PRC and the Philippines persist over Scarborough 
Shoal and on Second Thomas Shoal. BILL HAYTON, THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POWER IN ASIA 73–78, 81–84, 103–104, 160 (2014). 
19 Cf. UNCLOS arts. 3, 47, 55–75, 76–85 
20 UNCLOS art. 76(8), Annex II. Claims have to be submitted within ten years of the entry into force 
of the Convention for the respective State. UNCLOS art. 4, Annex II. 
21 Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale, U.N. Doc. CML/17/2009 
(May 7, 2009); Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China, Note Verbale, U.N. Doc. 
CML/18/2009 (May 7, 2009). 
22 Hayton, supra note 18, at 55. The number of dashes varies between nine and eleven. U.S. Dep’t of 
State, Bureau of Oceans and Int’l Envtl & Sci. Affairs, China: Maritime Claims in the South China 
Sea 3 (Dec. 5, 2014) [hereinafter Bureau of Oceans]. 
23 Bureau of Oceans, supra note 22, at 4.  
24 Id., at 4 (observing that all islands excluding Taiwan and Pratas Island encompass circa thirteen 
square kilometres). The Pratas Island encompasses circa two square kilometres. See Robert C. 
Beckman & Clive. H. Schofield, Defining EEZ Claims from Islands: A Potential South China Sea 
Change, INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 224 (2014). 
25 South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, ¶ 854. A striking visualization of the 
reclamation work is available at https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/.  
26 South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7. 
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legal arguments indirectly.27 Second, it published an official position paper on 
the arbitration panel's jurisdiction in December 2014.28 Third, through its 
ambassador to the Netherlands, the PRC also sent letters to the individual 
members of the arbitral tribunal.29 Despite these missives, China questioned the 
legitimacy of the arbitral tribunal: the involvement of the Japanese President of 
the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the establishment of 
the tribunal allegedly affected its impartiality.30 China also censured the arbitral 
tribunal for its composition31 and its alleged lack of independence, since the 
arbitrators “were taking money from the Philippines” and possibly “from 
others.”32 
The stark response to the Award itself has been alluded to above.33 The 
Chinese Foreign Ministry further claimed that Philippine actions in the South 
China Sea “grossly violated China’s territorial sovereignty, the Charter of the 
United Nations and fundamental principles of international law”; in the course 
of the arbitral proceedings, the Philippines had “distorted facts, misinterpreted 
laws and concocted a pack of lies,” and its claims were “a preposterous and 
deliberate distortion of international law.”34  
Yet the Chinese reaction was not limited to statements by State organs. As 
illustrated by the quixotic video-clip in Times Square, efforts were also made to 
 
27 Infra Part V.  
28 Government of the People's Republic of China, Position Paper of the Government of the People's 
Republic of China on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the 
Republic of the Philippines (Dec. 7, 2014), reprinted in 15 CHIN. J. INT'L L., 431–55 (2016). 
29 South China Sea Arbitration (Award), supra note 7, ¶¶ 42, 51, 96, 97, 100, 102–104. 
30 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, Beijing: Japanese Judge Means South China Sea Tribunal Is Biased, 
FOREIGN POL’Y (June 21, 2016), http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/21/beijing-japanese-judge-
means-south-china-sea-tribunal-is-biased-china-philippines-maritime-claims/. Under articles 3(c), 
(d) and (e) Annex VII of UNCLOS, the President of ITLOS is responsible for appointing the 
remaining panel members if the parties cannot reach an agreement. 
31 Although Thomas A. Mensah, a Ghanaian national, was the tribunal's president, China alleged that 
he is a long-term EU resident and criticised that the four remaining arbitrators were all European. 
Kor Kian Beng, China Insists on Right to Declare Air Defence Zone, STRAIT TIMES (July 13, 2016), 
http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/china-insists-on-right-to-declare-air-defence-zone (quoting Vice-
Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin); Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration Decisions on 
Jurisdiction and Rule of Law Concerns, 15 CHIN. J. INT’L L. 219, 222–23 (2016). Originally, a Sri 
Lankan president had been selected: South China Sea Arbitration (Jurisdiction), supra note 13, ¶ 30.  
32 Beng, supra note 31. The Philippine claim was frequently presented as a U.S. plot. See, e.g., 
Chinese Foreign Minister Says South China Sea Arbitration a Political Farce, XINHUANET (July 12, 
2016) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-07/13/c_135508275.htm. It should be noted, 
however, that Chinese non-participation in the arbitral proceedings was not a foregone conclusion: 
reportedly, several government lawyers argued for accepting the legal challenge. Wim Mueller, 
China’s Missed Opportunity in South China Sea Arbitration, CHATHAM HOUSE (Mar. 19, 2015), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/china-s-missed-opportunity-south-china-sea-
arbitration. 
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, supra note 12. 
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, China Adheres to the Position of Settling 
Through Negotiation the Relevant Disputes Between China and the Philippines in the South China 
Sea, ¶¶ 114, 119 (July 13, 2016), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/snhwtlcwj_1/t1380615.htm. 
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sway international public opinion, although with rather mixed results.35 With its 
eclectic choice of individual statements, the clip itself already illustrates China's 
difficulties in finding immediate and weighty international support for its 
position.36 
In addition, the Award elicited a plethora of patriotic outbursts on the home 
front. On social media, calls for a trade boycott or even war against the 
Philippines abounded;37 celebrities who did not post the image of a map with the 
nine-dash line on Weibo–the Chinese social media platform–were severely 
chastised.38 Presumably, public anger was also aimed at international institutions 
that were mistakenly assumed to be involved in the ruling: for several months 
after the ruling, a disclaimer on the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
homepage pointed out that the ICJ “had no involvement” in the arbitration 
proceedings and was a “totally distinct institution” from the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.39  
 
35 International support for China's position actually decreased between the arbitral rulings on 
jurisdiction (31 States publicly opposing the tribunal) and on the merits (six States publicly opposing 
its ruling). Who Is Taking Sides After the South China Sea Ruling?, 
ASIA MARITIME TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (Aug. 15, 2016), https://amti.csis.org/sides-in-south-
china-sea/.  
36 Cf. China Review Studio, supra note 3. Apart from Ms. West, the video featured a Chinese 
official, the Pakistani Ambassador to China, and a former London Economic and Business Policy 
Director (whose current position as a commentator for a Chinese government portal and Senior 
Fellow at Renmin University is not disclosed). Cf. John Ross, Columnists, CHINA.ORG (Mar. 20, 
2018), 
 http://china.org.cn/opinion/johnross.htm.  See also South China Sea Tribunal Ruling "Politicized": 
Syrian Analysts, XINHUANET (July 13, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
07/13/c_135508479.htm; No Reason for China to Accept South China Sea Arbitration Award: 
Bangladeshi Experts, XINHUANET (July 13, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
07/13/c_135508299.htm. On the role of domestic or mandated academics, see Part V, infra. 
37 Zheping Huang & Echo Huang, China’s Citizens Are Livid at the South China Sea Ruling Because 
They’ve Always Been Taught It Is Theirs, QUARTZ (July 13, 2016), https://qz.com/730669/chinas-
citizens-are-livid-at-the-south-china-sea-ruling-because-theyve-always-been-taught-it-is-theirs/. 
38 The map was accompanied by the slogan “China cannot lose even one bit of itself.” Gene Lin, 
Hong Kong Celebrities Defend China’s Claims in South China Sea After Int’l Court Ruling, HONG 
KONG FREE PRESS (July 14, 2016), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2016/07/14/hong-kong-
celebrities-defend-chinas-claims-in-south-china-sea-after-intl-court-ruling/. For (semi-)official praise 
for “patriotic stars,” see Wu Xinyuan (吳心遠), Mingxing da Vmen zai “Nanhai Yulun Zhan” Zhong 
de Biaoxian (明星大V們在“南海輿論戰”中的表現), RENMIN WANG (人民网) (July 15, 2016), 
http://yuqing.people.com.cn/BIG5/n1/2016/0715/c209043-28558600.html. For the repercussions for 
performers who have a Mainland following and who failed to post the map, see Taiwan Yiren “Bu 
Zhichi” Nanhai, Zaoshou Fensi Kuang Hong Luan Zha! (台灣藝人「不支持」南海，遭受粉絲狂
轟亂炸!), MEI RI TOUTIAO (每日頭條) (July 13, 2016), 
https://kknews.cc/entertainment/pxeon2.html (discussing a Taiwanese celebrity posting her own 
photo instead of the 9-dash map and receiving over 100,000 complaints on her Weibo account). 
Weibo is the Chinese equivalent of Twitter. 
39 The disclaimer was first printed in Chinese, which is not an official language of the Court. 
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php (last visited July 
20, 2016). A screenshot is available at http://www.cantab.net/users/langer/ICJ.jpg.  
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Clearly, China is unwilling to accept compulsory dispute settlement, at 
least on matters that are perceived to touch on its (extensively construed) 
sovereignty.40 Yet its absence before the arbitral tribunal does not necessarily 
amount to a repudiation of the UNCLOS regime, and the option of denouncing 
the Convention seems to have been dismissed.41 After the ruling, there were also 
some signs of détente between the parties, and in the region more generally.42 It 
remains to be seen whether these overtures herald a less confrontational 
approach, or whether they are primarily tactical in nature and merely serve to 
gloss over what has been called China’s “salami slicing” approach: the 
accumulation of small actions, such as island fortification, that do not provide a 
casus belli but over time add up to a major strategic shift.43 References to the 
nine-dash line may have become less frequent.44 Yet China has not made any 
material concessions; it still seeks to deal with other States in the South China 
Sea bilaterally, pushing for joint developments that would entail, at least, 
 
40 Trade issues, on the other hand, are not considered “that sensitive.”  International Law 
Programme Roundtable Meeting Summary: Exploring Public International Law and the Rights of 
Individuals with Chinese Scholars – Part 3, Mar. 5-6, 2016, CHATHAM HOUSE,  at 5 (comment by a 
Chinese roundtable participant), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/events/2016-03-05-exploring-public-
international-law-rights-individuals-part-3-meeting-summary.pdf. On Chinese participation in the 
WTO, see Simon Chesterman, Asia’s Ambivalence about International Law and Institutions: Past, 
Present and Futures, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 945, 959–60 (2016). 
41 This option was aired through semi-official channels after the Philippines had initiated 
proceedings. See Ellen Tordesillas, Will China Withdraw From UNCLOS if UN Court Decides in 
Favor of PH?, YAHOO! PHILIPPINES (Dec. 10, 2013), https://ph.news.yahoo.com/blogs/the-
inbox/china-withdraw-unclos-un-court-decides-favor-ph-153936547.html. It was also discussed in 
the run-up to the Award. See Tara Davenport, Why China Shouldn't Denounce UNCLOS, DIPLOMAT 
(Mar. 24, 2016), http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/why-china-shouldnt-denounce-unclos/ (rejecting 
denunciation); Stefan Talmon, Denouncing UNCLOS Remains Option for China After Tribunal 
Ruling, GLOBAL TIMES (July 6, 2016), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/971707.shtml (arguing 
that denunciation should depend on a “legal and political cost-benefit analysis”). An official 
statement after the Award does not elaborate the point, but emphasizes that China has so far 
faithfully implemented and 
upheld UNCLOS. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry 
Spokesperson Lu Kang's Regular Press Conference on July 12, 2016, (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2511_665403/t1380374.shtml. 
42 Benjamin Kang Lim & Ben Blanchard, China May Give Filipino Fishermen Access to 
Scarborough, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-philippines-
exclusive/exclusive-china-may-give-filipino-fishermen-access-to-scarborough-sources-
idUSKCN12I19I; Raul Dancel, Deal on Framework of South China Sea Code, THE STRAIT TIMES 
(Aug. 7, 2017), http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/deal-on-framework-of-s-china-sea-code. 
Overall, this strategy has worked well so far. See A Chinese Lake, ECONOMIST, June 23, 2018, at 48. 
43 Robert Haddick, Salami Slicing in the South China Sea, FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/03/salami-slicing-in-the-south-china-sea/. See SCOTT SNYDER, 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE: PROSPECTS FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 8 (U.S. Institute for 
Peace ed. Special Report No. 18, 1996) (referring to such actions as “salami tactics”). 
44 Chesterman, supra note 40, at 973. 
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implicit recognition of its extensive claims.45 On balance, it seems rather 
unlikely that China’s attitude will change substantially. 
Compared to the reaction of the PRC, the Philippines’ response to its 
success before the arbitral tribunal has been much more measured. Shortly 
before the tribunal issued its Award, the term of the Philippine president who 
had initiated the proceedings, Benigno Aquino, ended. He was succeeded by 
Rodrigo Duterte. While campaigning, Duterte had promised to ride a Jet Ski to 
plant the Philippine flag on islands that it claims, and that he would willingly 
sacrifice his own life doing so.46 After assuming office on June 30, 2016, the 
new president promised to accept the tribunal’s verdict regardless of the 
outcome, but expressed optimism for a ruling favorable to the Philippines.47 The 
immediate Philippine reaction to the Award was very cautious, with the foreign 
secretary appealing for “restraint and sobriety.”48 The new president at first 
stressed the relevance of the arbitral Award for the peaceful resolution of the 
disputes in the “West Philippine Sea, otherwise known as (the South) China 
Sea.”49 He also threatened retaliation for any territorial infringement and 
promised to work with other East Asian leaders towards the implementation of 
the arbitral Award.50  
At the East Asia Summit in Laos in September 2016, however, the 
president eventually chose not to call publicly on China to respect the ruling, 
although a corresponding statement had already been prepared.51 The omission 
was apparently prompted by irritation over U.S. criticism of human rights 
 
45 Cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Set Aside Dispute and Pursue Joint 
Development”, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3604_665547/t18023.shtml (last 
visited Sept. 22, 2017). The application to the South China Sea of the principle of “setting aside 
disputes,” which dates back to Deng Xiaoping, is also advocated by Chinese scholars. See, e.g., 
Zhang Xinjun, “Setting Aside Disputes and Pursuing Joint Development” at Crossroads in South 
China Sea, in TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: NAVIGATING ROUGH WATERS 39–
53 (Jing Huang & Andrew Billo eds., 2015). For a critical outlook, see Prashanth Parameswaran, 
Beware the Illusion of China-ASEAN South China Sea Breakthroughs, DIPLOMAT (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/beware-the-illusion-of-china-asean-south-china-sea-
breakthroughs/. 
46 Talk Duterte to Me, ECONOMIST, July 9, 2016, at 43. 
47 Frances Mangosing, Duterte Optimistic of Favorable Sea Ruling, PHILIPPINES DAILY INQUIRER, 
July 5, 2016. 
48 Melba Maggay, Taking on the Dragon, PHILIPPINES DAILY INQUIRER (July 26, 2016), 
http://opinion.inquirer.net/95950/taking-on-the-dragon. 
49 Philippines' Duterte Insists on Using Arbitral Ruling vs. China, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, July 25, 
2016. 
50 Bullit Marquez, Duterte Toughens anti-China Rhetoric - There Will Be Blood if Philippine 
Territory Breached, MACAU DAILY TIMES (Aug. 26, 2016), 
https://macaudailytimes.com.mo/duterte-toughens-anti-china-rhetoric-will-blood-philippine-
territory-breached.html. 
51 Minoru Satake, ASEAN Takes a Diffident Stance on the South China Sea, NIKKEI ASIA REVIEW 
(Sept. 15, 2016), https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/ASEAN-takes-a-diffident-stance-on-the-South-
China-Sea. 
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violations in the Philippines,52 and it was followed by an abrupt policy change. 
Declaring that China now had military superiority in the region, the president of 
the Philippines announced a “separation” from its long-time ally and called for 
an end of U.S. military assistance.53 He expressed doubts as to whether the 
United States would be willing to provide effective support should an armed 
conflict break out over the contested islands;54 in October, joint military 
maneuvers and patrols in the South China Sea were put on hold.55  
While the change in government has made Philippine politics more 
unpredictable, it is far from certain that its traditional alliance with the United 
States or its erstwhile stance on the dispute in the South China Sea will change 
significantly.56 First, cooperation between U.S. and Philippine armed forces is 
deeply entrenched; most senior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
have completed part of their training in the United States.57 Also, the temporary 
realignment with China seems to have been triggered primarily by personal 
animosity between the newly elected president and his then-American 
counterpart. More importantly, no Philippine leader could risk making any 
concessions on sovereignty issues in the South China Sea. Accordingly, the 
president’s statements on the dispute have become more bellicose again, and 
military cooperation with U.S. naval forces has continued.58  
The United States has largely refrained from commenting on the recent 
shifting of Philippine policies, although it threatens an important element of the 
so-called “pivot” to Asia.59 With regard to the arbitral Award, the United States 
 
52 Id. 
53 Mark Landler, Philippines ‘Separation’ From U.S. Jilts Clinton, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2016, 
at 3. 
54 Jane Perlez, Philippines May ‘Pivot’ Away From the U.S. on China Visit This Week, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 18, 2016, at A4. The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of the 
Philippines, U.S.-Phil., Aug. 30, 1951, 177 U.N.T.S. 133, provides for mutual support in case of an 
armed attack on islands, yet it is unclear whether that provision also applies to contested territory. 
Catherine Wong, Duterte’s Tilt Towards China Set to ‘Test US Pivot to Asia’, S. CHINA MORNING 
POST, Oct. 22, 2016. 
55 Felipe Villamor, Philippine President Raises Doubts About U.S. Military Ties, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
30, 2016, at 5. Under Duterte’s predecessor, cooperation had just been deepened. See Agreement 
between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States 
of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation, U.S.-Phil., Apr. 28, 2014, T.I.A.S. No. 14-0625. 
56 Pivot or Pirouette?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2017, at 46. 
57 Richard C. Paddock, Rodrigo Duterte, Pushing Split With U.S., Counters Philippines' Deep Ties, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/27/world/asia/philippines-duterte-
united-states-alliance.html. See also ALFRED W. MCCOY, CLOSER THAN BROTHERS: MANHOOD AT 
THE PHILIPPINE MILITARY ACADEMY 20 (1999). 
58 Duterte Orders Military to Occupy South China Sea Areas, PHILIPPINE STAR, Apr. 6, 2017; US 
Guided-missile Destroyer now in Subic, PHILIPPINE STAR, Apr. 2, 2017. President Duterte also 
invoked the arbitral award in bilateral meetings with the Chinese president. Xi Threatened to Start 
War Over S China Sea: Duterte, TAIPEI TIMES, May 21, 2017, at 1. 
59 See THOMAS LUM & BEN DOLVEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43498, THE REPUBLIC OF THE 
PHILIPPINES AND U.S. INTERESTS (May 2014). On the U.S. pivot to Asia, see MARK E. MANYIN ET 
AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42448, PIVOT TO THE PACIFIC? THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S 
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did not—in line with its official practice —take a position on individual claims 
or the merits of the case, although the United States emphasized that the ruling 
invalidated China’s nine-dash line claim, ruled out an EEZ for most of the 
contested maritime features, and found Chinese fishing and reclamation to be 
violations of Philippine rights.60 More generally, the United States reiterated its 
strong support for the rule of law and for “efforts to resolve territorial and 
maritime disputes in the South China Sea peacefully, including through 
arbitration.”61 It stressed that the parties to UNCLOS had also agreed to the 
Convention’s compulsory dispute settlement process to resolve disputes, and 
pointed out that the tribunal had unanimously found that the Philippines was 
acting within its rights under the Convention in initiating arbitration 
proceedings.62 The tribunal’s decision was “final and legally binding on both 
China and the Philippines,” and the United States expressed “its hope and 
expectation that both parties will comply with their obligations,” encouraging 
the claimants “to clarify their maritime claims in accordance with international 
law—as reflected in the Law of the Sea Convention.”63 
This response was a continuation of the U.S. government’s general 
approach prior to the arbitral Award, which focused on the international rule of 
law.64 It also emphasizes the global dimension of the dispute in the South China 
Sea.65 In 2010 already, Secretary of State Clinton underlined that the United 
States had—“like every nation”—a “national interest in freedom of navigation, 
open access to Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in 
the South China Sea.”66 In international fora, President Obama subsequently 
reiterated on numerous occasions the importance of maintaining “a rules-based 
order in the maritime domain based on the principles of international law, in 
particular as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea.”67 Before the UN General Assembly, he stressed the United States’ 
 
“REBALANCING” TOWARD ASIA, (March 2012). 
60 Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Background Briefing on South China Sea Arbitration, 
(July 12, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259976.htm.  
61 U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Decision in the Philippines-China Arbitration: Press 
Statement,(July 12, 2016), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/259587.htm.  
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Cf., e.g., Bureau of Oceans, supra note 22, at 8 (defining the international law of the sea as the 
applicable legal framework and as its basis of analysis).  
65 Geoffrey Till, The Global Significance of the South China Sea Disputes, in THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA 13, 13-14 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy eds. 2016).  
66 Secretary of State, Remarks at Press Availability, Vietnam (July 23, 2010). 
67 Joint Statement: Group of Seven Leaders' Declaration, DAILY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL 
DOCUMENTS (DCPD) DCPD-201500422  (June 8, 2015); see also The President's News Conference 
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia,  DCPD-201500836 (Nov. 22, 2015); Joint Statement of the United 
States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Special Leaders Summit (Sunnylands Declaration), 
DCPD-201600082 (Feb. 12, 2016); Remarks Prior to a Meeting With Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations Leaders in Vientiane, Laos, DCPD-201600557 (Sept. 8, 2016); The President's News 
Conference in Vientiane, Laos, DCPD-201600570 (Sept. 8, 2016). 
BJIL_36-3_ARTICLE 2_LANGER  
2018] SOUTH CHINA SEA 394 
“interest in upholding the basic principles of freedom of navigation and the free 
flow of commerce and in resolving disputes through international law, not the 
law of force.” 68 In meetings with regional leaders prior to and after the arbitral 
Award, President Obama emphasized the “imperative of upholding the 
internationally-recognized freedoms of navigation and overflight”;69 at the same 
time, he asserted that U.S. interests were limited to protecting these principles, 
and to making sure that “the rules of the road” were upheld.70 
Had she been elected, Hillary Clinton—a vocal advocate of the “pivot” to 
Asia—would presumably have continued this policy, albeit perhaps more 
aggressively.71 However, the arbitral Award on the South China Sea (as well as 
the emphasis on international law) clearly enjoyed bipartisan support.72 And 
while Donald Trump’s position on the South China Sea remained vague during 
his campaign, he chided China for “totally disregarding” the United States by 
building “a military fortress the likes of which perhaps the world has not 
seen.”73 He also refused to rule out an armed response.74 His campaign platform 
advocated “bolstering the U.S. military presence in the East and South China 
Seas to discourage Chinese adventurism.”75 But his campaign team also 
 
68 Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, DCPD-201500657 (Sept. 28, 
2015); Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, DCPD-201600612 
(Sept. 20, 2016). 
69 United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, DCPD-201500482  (July 7, 2015); see also Joint 
Statement by President Obama and President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo of Indonesia, DCPD-
201500756 (October 26, 2015), Remarks Following a Tour of the Philippine Navy Frigate BRP 
Gregorio del Pilar in Manila, Philippines, DCPD-201500816  (Nov. 17, 2015), Remarks Following a 
Meeting With Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phi Trong of Vietnam (July 7, 2015), 
Joint Statement by President Obama and President Trna Dai Quang of Vietnam, DCPD-201600345 
(May 23, 2016), Remarks in Vientiane, Laos, DCPD-201600563 (Sept. 6, 2016). 
70 The President's News Conference With President Xi Jinping of China, DCPD-201500646 (Sept. 
25, 2015). 
71 In her platform, she promised to “press China to play by the rules” with regard to, inter alia, 
territorial disputes in Asia, “and hold [China] accountable if it does not”: Hillary for President: 
National Security (2016), https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/national-security/. See also Why 
China May Favor Donald Trump Over Hillary Clinton, NEWSWEEK (July 7, 2016), 
http://www.newsweek.com/china-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-south-china-sea-beijing-xi-jinping-
479536.  
72 Cf. Statement by Senators McCain and Sullivan on South China Sea Arbitration Award (July 12, 
2016), https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/7/statement-by-senators-mccain-and-
sullivan-on-south-china-sea-arbitration-award (“With today’s award, China faces a choice. China 
can choose to be guided by international law, institutions, and norms. Or it can choose to reject them 
and pursue the path of intimidation and coercion.”) See also South China Sea and East China Sea 
Sanctions Act, S. 695, 115th Cong. (2017). 
73 Maggie Haberman & David A. Sanger, Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign 
Policy Views, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-
trump-transcript.html?_r=2. 
74Id. (“Would I go to war? Look, let me just tell you. There’s a question I wouldn’t want to answer. 
[…] I don’t want to say what I’d do because, again, we need unpredictability. […] I wouldn’t want 
them to know what my real thinking is.”). 
75 Trump Campaign, US-China Trade Reform, 2 (2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/U.S.-
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maintained the emphasis on freedom of navigation and overflight as “a key 
principle of the international rules-based order.”76 
After the election, there have been indications that the fundamentals of U.S. 
policy towards the South China Sea have not changed, and in fact may even 
have become more assertive. In his confirmation hearings, the new Secretary of 
State, Rex Tillerson, held that China’s island-building in the South China Sea 
was “an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international 
norms,”77 and he went as far as to suggest that Chinese access to the artificial 
islands should be prevented.78 President Trump has also underscored “the 
importance of maintaining a maritime order based on international law, 
including freedom of navigation and overflight and other lawful uses of the sea,” 
indirectly calling on China to “act in accordance with international law” in the 
South China Sea.79 
II. 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
A. Historical and Political Contingencies of the Law of the Sea 
Both China and the United States insist on safeguarding the “fundamental 
principles of international law” in the South China Sea.80 Yet they come to 
diametrically opposed conclusions as to what these principles are. While they 
both invoke the law of the sea, their claims illustrate that maritime law has 
served very different purposes in different contexts.  
The United States’ constant insistence on free navigation harkens back to 
the principle of the freedom of the open sea, or mare liberum, according to 
which no nation could appropriate the oceans or prevent other States’ ships from 
crossing them.81 That principle, however, did not always apply; it originated 
from specific historical circumstances.  
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77 Secretary of State Designate Senate Confirmation Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 
115th Cong. (2017) (opening statement of nominee Rex Wayne Tillerson). 
78 Secretary of State Confirmation Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 115th Cong. 
(2017) (statement of nominee Rex Wayne Tillerson), https://www.c-span.org/video/?421335-
4/secretary-state-confirmation-hearing-part-3.  
79 Joint Statement by President Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, DCPD-201700112 
(Feb. 10, 2017). See also Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesperson, Secretary Pompeo's Meeting 
With Chinese Officials Including President Xi Jinping, Politburo Member Yang Jiechi, State 
Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi (June 14, 2018), 
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/06/283236.htm. 
80 Government of the People's Republic of China, supra note 28; for the U.S. position see the 
statements and declarations supra note 69. 
81 ROBERT Y. JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOLUME I: PEACE 
BJIL_36-3_ARTICLE 2_LANGER  
2018] SOUTH CHINA SEA 396 
The concept of mare liberum dates back to the eponymous pamphlet that 
Hugo Grotius published (anonymously) in 1609.82 His polemic was aimed 
against Portugal and Spain: when extending their rule to Africa, Asia, and 
America, they had claimed ownership not only of the newly discovered lands, 
but also of the sea that they had crossed—a claim that was corroborated 
repeatedly by the Papacy.83 Writing at the behest of the Dutch East India 
Company, Grotius’ primary aim was to “demonstrate briefly and clearly that the 
Dutch . . .  have the right to sail to the Indians as they are now doing and to 
engage in trade with them.”84 But relying on natural law considerations, he also 
made the more general claim that “occupation of the sea is impermissible both 
in the natural order and for reasons of public utility”;85 hence, “no part of the sea 
may be regarded as pertaining to the domain of any given nation,”86 nor could 
historic claims based on prior exploration (ante alios navigare) preclude other 
seafarers:87 by perpetual law, the sea was dedicated to common use.88 
Foreshadowing today’s conflicts, Grotius also recalled that “in ancient times. . . 
it was held to be the greatest of all crimes” to oppose those “who were willing to 
submit to arbitration the settlement of their difficulties.”89 
But as indicated by its sponsors, although Grotius’ pamphlet may have 
purported to further the “common benefit of mankind,”90 it also served the very 
concrete trading interests of the Staten-Generaal, the States General of the 
Netherlands, as an emerging economic power.91 The freedom of the seas as 
advocated by Grotius was an essential precondition for the subsequent economic 
and political dominance of Western States and their colonial and imperialistic 
expansion.92  
Just as international legal norms in general do, the law of the sea reflects 
and underpins the power structure of the respective era. Western insistence on 
the freedom of the seas thus also aims to preserve an order that has served 
 
§§ 278–279 (9th ed. 1996). 
82 HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (Robert Feenstra ed., Brill 2009) (1609). 
83 WILHELM GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 257–58 (Michael Byers ed., trans., 
2000). 
84 GROTIUS, supra note 82, ch. i, p. 1 (the page numbers refer to the facsimile). 
85 Id. at ch. v, p. 28. 
86 Id. at ch. v, p. 26 (emphasis added). 
87 Id. at ch. v, p. 31. 
88 Id. at ch. vii p. 43 (“Est autem lex illa perpetua ut Mare omnibus usu commune sit” (But that law 
is perpetual that the use of the sea should be common to all)). 
89 Id. at Fol. 6 recto. 
90 Id. at ch. xiii, p. 66. 
91 Cf. Peter Borschberg, Hugo Grotius' Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Revisiting Mare 
Liberum (1609), 29 ITINERARIO 31, 36 (2005). 
92 See Martine Julia Van Ittersum, Hugo Grotius in Context: Van Heemskerck's Capture of the Santa 
Catarina and its Justification in De Jure Praedae (1604-1606), 31 ASIAN J. SOC. SCI. 511, 535 
(2003) and more generally EDWARD KEENE, BEYOND THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: GROTIUS, 
COLONIALISM AND ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 60 (2002).  
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European powers and the United States particularly well. Numerous non-
Western nations, on the other hand, experienced the vaunted mare liberum 
primarily as a means for the West to capitalize on its maritime superiority, both 
militarily and economically. Gunboat diplomacy or the display of naval 
superiority became an important means of coercion.93  
Chinese preoccupation about controlling access to the South China Sea 
should be considered in this light as well: starting with the first Opium War, 
naval superiority was instrumental in imposing a series of unequal treaties.94 The 
cession of Hong Kong, for instance, provided the British with an additional 
trading post and a base for their fleet.95 As a latecomer to the modern 
international legal order, China has first-hand experience of its vagaries, such as 
the imposition of consular jurisdiction in the nineteenth, or the fiction of the 
Republic of China’s seat on the UN Security Council in the twentieth century. If 
life punishes latecomers, international law does so with a vengeance, and the 
freedom of the seas is an example of a universalized concept that was put 
forward by, and has long served the exclusive interests of, Western powers. This 
background might also contribute to Chinese distrust of arbitral proceedings and 
their alleged restriction of sovereignty.96  
Yet as a mirror to the relative power of States, the law of the seas is also 
susceptible to changes in the fabric of the international community. In the days 
of British naval superiority, the territorial waters were defined as narrowly as 
possible, for the benefit of British control of the oceans.97 The established sea 
powers successfully resisted any extension to their detriment at the Hague 
Conference (1930) and the Second United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea in Geneva (1960).98 But the extended discussion in The Hague and 
Geneva already heralded change. Several States—particularly newly 
independent ones—extended their territorial waters to twelve nautical miles.99 
Yet even for the established sea powers, the freedom of the seas was not a 
matter of principle, but of convenience. If it suited their interests, they did not 
 
93 The “black ships” of Commodore Perry provide perhaps the starkest example of the pivotal role 
that naval superiority played in furthering Western interests in the Far East, cf. MATTHEW 
CALBRAITH PERRY, NARRATIVE OF THE EXPEDITION OF AN AMERICAN SQUADRON TO THE CHINA 
SEAS AND JAPAN (Francis L. Hawks ed., 1856). 
94 For an overview, see IMMANUEL CHUNG-YUEH HSÜ, THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA 168–220 (6th 
ed. 2000).  
95 STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 20–21 (2004). 
96 Beng, supra note 31; Yee supra note 31; Chinese Foreign Minister Says South China Sea 
Arbitration a Political Farce, supra note 32. 
97 See Andree Kirchner, Law of the Sea, History of, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW [hereinafter MPEPIL] ¶¶ 16–19 (2007), www.mpepil.com.  
98 YOSHIFUMI TANAKA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 21 (2d ed. 2015); D.W. Bowett, The 
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 9 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 415, 416 (1960). On 
the conferences, see also Shabtai Rosenne & Julia Gebhard, Conferences on the Law of the Sea, 
MPEPIL ¶¶ 9, 19–21 (2008). 
99 Sarah Wolf, Territorial Sea, MPEPIL, ¶ 6 (2011). 
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hesitate to raise claims to exclusiveness, as evidenced by the Truman 
Proclamation of 1945.100 The continental shelf that the Proclamation established 
was “tailored to the need of the United States,” allowing for the exclusive 
exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the Gulf of Mexico while preserving 
U.S. fisheries’ interests off the shores of other States.101 Numerous States 
emulated the United States and claimed exclusive rights to the “natural 
prolongation of [their] land territory into and under the sea.”102  
Subsequently, the selective approach reflecting the needs of the major 
seafaring nations came under increasing pressure, as evidenced by the prolonged 
discussions between developing and industrialized States, and the Third UN 
Conference on the Law of the Sea (1974-1982). The developing countries aimed 
to establish extensive exclusive economic zones to safeguard against technically 
advanced competition; the industrialized States insisted on freedom of 
navigation and free exploitation of the resources of the high seas and the deep 
seabed.103 With the introduction in UNCLOS of an EEZ, the extension of the 
territorial sea to twelve nautical miles, and the designation of the deep sea as the 
“common heritage of mankind,”104 the developing countries appeared to have 
carried the day on most contentious issues. As a result, the United States called 
for a vote on the Convention at the final session and voted against it. Several 
industrialized nations abstained.105 Only after the revision of UNCLOS by a 
1994 agreement did the Convention eventually enter into force.106 
The United States was mainly concerned about the regime of seabed 
mining107 (most other parts of the Convention were considered customary 
international law by the United States).108 These concerns were instrumental in 
drafting the 1994 Agreement. Yet the United States still has not ratified the 
Convention. Consecutive U.S. administrations have subsequently pressed for 
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Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982, G.A. Res. 48/236, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/236/Annex (July 28, 1994). On the process, 
see Stefan Talmon, Seerecht, in LEXIKON DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN 455, 459–60 (Helmut Volger 
ed., 2000).  
107 See Doug Bandow, UNCLOS III: A Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475, 477 (1982). 
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U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.192 (Dec. 9, 1982). 
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ratification, and the detrimental effects of U.S. non-participation have been 
widely acknowledged,109 specifically in the context of the South China Sea.110 
Yet Senate consent has remained elusive. Opposition has been primarily based 
on vague concerns over the loss of (extensively construed) sovereignty.111 
Objections have been voiced against multilateral fora, where U.S. influence is 
not untrammeled,112 when the benefits of UNCLOS could also be achieved 
“through bilateral and regional agreements.”113 In addition, security concerns 
persist;114 so do concerns over “creeping jurisdiction” of international courts115 
which would “not have the heritage and the clarity of understanding of the 
jurisdiction question” relating to international disputes, leading to the risks of 
compulsory adjudication or arbitration.116  
This attitude contrasts sharply with constant U.S. insistence on the 
paramount importance of UNCLOS and peaceful dispute settlement for the 
conflicts in the South China Sea. As set out above, the United States emphasizes 
that adherence to the rules laid down in UNCLOS and respect for its dispute 
settlement procedures are pivotal for the maintenance of “peace, security, and 
stability” in the region.117 Yet the United States raises reservations that are not 
very different from Chinese objections to compulsory jurisdiction.  
B. Implications for the Maintenance of International Peace & Security 
One of the purposes of UNCLOS was to establish “a legal order for the 
seas and oceans which will facilitate international communication, and will 
promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans.”118 The conflict in the South 
China Sea is now testing that legal order, and hence the maintenance of 
international peace and security as envisaged in Article 1, Section 1 of the 
 
109 Elliot Richardson, Treasure Beneath the Sea, N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 19; Vern Clark & 
Thomas R. Pickering, A Treaty That Lifts All Boats, N. Y. TIMES, July 14, 2007, at A11; see 
generally Military Implications of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 108th Cong. (2004). 
110 Calling upon the United States Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Draft), H.R. Res. 631, 114th Cong. (2016) (“. . . 
the House of Representatives . . . recommends the ratification of UNCLOS remain a top priority for 
the administration, . . . having most recently been underscored by the strategic challenges the United 
States faces in the Asia-Pacific region and more specifically in the South China Sea.”).  
111 Cf. Baker Spring, All Conservatives Should Oppose UNCLOS, 12 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 453–58 
(2008). 
112 Military Implications, supra note 109, at 59–60 (Statement of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick). 
113 Id. at 57 (Statement of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick). 
114 Id. at 67 (Sen. Inhofe). 
115 Id. at 52 (Sen. Ensign). 
116 Id. at 53 (Sen. Sessions). Specific concerns were also voiced over the possibility of China 
instigating arbitral proceedings against the United States. Id. at 49 (Sen. Inhofe).  
117 United States-Vietnam Joint Vision Statement, supra note 69; Joint Statement of the United 
States-Association of Southeast Asian Nations Special Leaders Summit, supra note 67. 
118 UNCLOS pmbl. at 4. 
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United Nations Charter. Tensions in the South China Sea could easily escalate. 
Armed conflicts have repeatedly flared up in the region.119 Over the past years, 
some coastal States have embarked on significant naval armament, most notably 
China.120 The stark imbalance between the armed forces of the PRC and its 
neighbor makes a military confrontation, at least in the South China Sea, less 
likely—although nationalist furore (stoked, for instance, by the stationing of a 
Chinese oil rig in contested waters)121 could still lead to unforeseen outcomes. 
Even such quixotic enterprises as the Philippine outpost on the Second Thomas 
Shoal in the Spratly Islands may well result in sudden clashes.122 
By far greater—and more consequential—is the risk of a conflict between 
the United States and China over the South China Sea. The United States has 
projected naval power worldwide, starting with the voyage of the “Great White 
Fleet” in 1907–1909.123 Since the late 1970s the United States has been 
systematically conducting freedom of navigation operations in an effort to 
counter allegedly excessive claims by coastal States and to bolster its 
understanding of the freedom of the seas as set out in the previous Part.124 In the 
South China Sea such operations have led to immediate tensions with China. For 
example, the United States considered the transit of the destroyer U.S.S. Larsen 
within 12 nautical miles of an artificial structure on Subi Reef in October 2015 a 
routine freedom of navigation exercise; China, instead, called it a serious 
provocation and a threat to China’s sovereignty and security interests, and 
warned that such “dangerous, provocative acts” could eventually spark a war.125 
Several similar operations have since been conducted, each time with a 
 
119 HAYTON, supra note 18. 
120 While these efforts may still primarily be aimed at modernising national navies, they also carry 
“potential arms race implications”. Bernard F. W. Loo, Naval Modernisation in South-east Asia: 
Modernisation versus Arms Race, NAVAL MODERNISATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA 283, 283 (G. Till 
& J. Chan eds., 2014). The build-up of air forces is even more conspicuous, see Ryosuke Hanafusa, 
China's Dismissal of Maritime Ruling Could Accelerate Asia's Arms Race, NIKKEI ASIAN REVIEW 
(July 28, 2016), http://asia.nikkei.com/magazine/20160728-GENERATION-CHANGE/Politics-
Economy/China-s-dismissal-of-maritime-ruling-could-accelerate-Asia-s-arms-race. 
121 Hot Oil on Troubled Water, ECONOMIST, May 18, 2014; Mike Ives, Vietnam Assails China in Sea 
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2016), at A4.  
122 The Philippine landing ship BRP Sierra Madre (originally built in the United States during the 
Second World War) was run aground in 1999 on Second Thomas Shoal to maintain Philippine 
claims; for a graphic depiction of the situation aboard, see Jeff Himmelman, A Game of Shark and 
Minnow, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/. 
123 Cf. JAMES R. RECKNER, TEDDY ROOSEVELT'S GREAT WHITE FLEET (1988) (recounting the 
circumnavigation of the world by sixteen battleships of the US Atlantic Fleet, dispatched by 
President Roosevelt to display the United States’ new status as a naval power). 
124 Dale Stephens & Tristan Skousgaard, Naval Demonstrations and Manoeuvres, MPEPIL para. 14 
(2009). The U.S. Department of Defence issues annual reports on such operations. See DoD Annual 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) Reports, http://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/FON/. 
125 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, United States Conducts Naval Operation Within 
Twelve Nautical Miles of Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Prompting Protests from China, 
110 AM. J. INT’L. L. 120, 122 (2016). 
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corresponding reaction from China126 and U.S. insistence that such missions 
merely asserted "the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters 
… on behalf of states all around the world, including China."127 More recently, 
China seized a U.S. underwater drone near Subic Bay on the Philippines,128 and 
a U.S. carrier group started patrolling the South China Sea.129 After some 
hesitation, the new administration has also resumed freedom of navigation 
operations.130 
Air incidents provide even more potential for uncontrollable consequences 
and may require momentous decisions within minutes.131 Such incidents would 
multiply were China to declare, as threatened in the wake of the Hague ruling, 
an Air Defence and Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea,132 
following the precedent it set when establishing and ADIZ over the East China 
Sea in 2013.133 States have a right to establish such zones and to require entering 
airplanes to identify themselves—yet under international customary law, that 
right has been limited to civil airplanes intending to enter the respective national 
airspace.134 However, in the East China Sea, China has tried to enforce a much 
more aggressive regime that is not limited to civilian airplanes on their way to 
Chinese airspace, and has threatened to use "defensive emergency measures" 
against non-cooperating planes.135 
Such idiosyncrasy in interpretation not only applies to no-fly zones, but 
also to the Chinese understanding of free navigation. After some disagreements 
during the Cold War, the right of innocent passage has generally been construed 
broadly (and in line with U.S. exigencies). Under the currently prevailing view, 
that right presumably includes the passage of warships through the territorial 
 
126 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, United States Continues to Challenge Chinese 
Claims in South China Sea; Law of the Sea Tribunal Issues Award Against China in Philippines-
China Arbitration, 110 AM. J. INT’L. L. 795, 795—98 (2016). 
127 Office of the Press Secretary, Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, THE WHITE HOUSE 
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/21/press-briefing-
press-secretary-josh-earnest-10212016. 
128 China Seizes an Underwater Drone and Sends a Signal to Donald Trump, ECONOMIST (Dec. 24, 
2016). 
129 Xu Lushan, US Resumes Its Provocative Actions in Sea, CHINA DAILY (Feb. 22, 2017). 
130 US Navigation Game not Good for Better Relations, CHINA DAILY (May 26, 2017) (regarding the 
U.S.S. Dewey bypassing Mischief Reef); US Missile Destroyer Trespassing Territorial Waters 
'Serious Provocation', CHINA DAILY (July 3, 2017) (regarding the U.S.S. Stethem bypassing Triton 
Island). 
131 Cf. Jane Perlez, Chinese Fighters Flew Too Close, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, A6 (May 20, 2017). 
132 An Baije, Air Defense Zone Called Option, CHINA DAILY (July 14, 2016). 
133 J. Ashley Roach, Air Defence Identification Zones, MPEPIL para. 14 (2015). 
134 Id. at para. 6. 
135 Id. at para. 14. The U.S. has indicated that an ADIZ over the South China Sea would be ignored. 
See Missy Ryan, U.S. Plans to Stick to its Script in the Pacific - Cautiously, WASHINGTON POST, 
A12 (July 13, 2016). 
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sea.136 China, on the other hand, has put forward a much more restricted 
interpretation that limits any military presence not only in territorial waters, but 
even in the EEZ.137 Such a restricted view reflects the painful historical 
experiences mentioned above;138conversely, the U.S. position mirrors its need to 
secure navigation lanes for its carrier groups, to support its allies in the Pacific 
region, and to secure access to its military bases.  
Since World War II, U.S. carrier groups have allowed the United States to 
provide the military support necessary for its domination of the global 
commons.139 The first deployment of the first Chinese carrier, the Liaoning, to 
the South China Sea in 2013 was therefore highly symbolic, and it was 
symptomatic that a serious incident with a U.S. destroyer ensued.140 An equally 
clear signal was sent by the drills that the Liaoning held in the South China Sea 
after the arbitral ruling.141 The ultimate aims of such endeavors are clear: to 
restrict U.S. access to its regional allies, to supplant the United States as regional 
hegemon, and to establish an exclusive Chinese sphere of influence. And in this 
undertaking, China will not be deterred by the ruling of an arbitral tribunal or 
concerns over UNCLOS provisions. 
Such behavior is not without precedent. The United States also refused, at 
first, to participate in most of the proceedings in the Nicaragua case and then to 
heed the judgement of the ICJ.142 The Chinese aim to establish an exclusive 
 
136 Cf. Innocent Passage: U.S.-USSR Uniform Interpretation, 84 AM. J. INT’L. L. 239-42 (1990). 
This view is opposed by some forty, mainly developing countries, including China. See Yoshifumi 
Tanaka, Navigational Rights and Freedoms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
536, 546 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
137 The PRC considers such a presence incompatible with the peaceful use of the sea prescribed by 
Art. 310 UNCLOS. See Till, supra note 65, at 23-24; see also Xinjun Zhang, The Latest 
Developments of the US Freedom of Navigation Programs in the South China Sea: Deregulation or 
Re-balance, 9 J. E. ASIA & INT’L. L. 167, 167-82 (2016). 
138 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. China had already opposed innocent passage for 
warships at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. See 2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY 155, para. 19.1 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne 
eds., 1993). Chinese attitudes may change, however, as a consequence of China’s increasing naval 
power; the Chinese Navy has not only made significant contributions to counter-piracy efforts at the 
Horn of Africa, but also conducted surveillance operations in the EEZ of Hawaii and Guam. See 
Andrew Poulin, Going Blue: The Transformation of China’s Navy, THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 16, 2016), 
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/going-blue-the-transformation-of-chinas-navy/; Till, supra note 66, 
at 25.  
139 Cf. Andrew F. Hart & Bruce D. Jones, How Do Rising Powers Rise?, 52 SURVIVAL 63, 79 
(2010). 
140 Mark J. Valencia, The South China Sea and the "Thucydides Trap," THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 59, 
67 (C. J. Jenner & Tran Truong Thuy eds., 2016). 
141 Cf. Ministry of Defence, People’s Republic of China, China Aircraft Carrier Conducts Drill in S. 
China Sea (Jan. 3, 2017), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2017-01/03/content_4769023.htm. 
142 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); Judgement of 
the International Court of Justice of 27 June 1986 Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua, G.A. Res. 44/43, U.N. Doc. A/Res/44/43 (Dec. 7, 1989). It may be argued 
that by now the U.S. has substantially implemented the judgement, but it would have done so on its 
own terms and at its own convenience. The same holds true, mutatis mutandis, for Russia in the 
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sphere of influence also follows previous examples, most notably the Monroe 
Doctrine, which was granted precedence even under the League of Nations 
Covenant.143 But there are more worrisome and more fundamental historical 
parallels. In the context of the South China Sea, where the prospect of conflict 
between the United States and China evokes the rivalry between Sparta and 
Athens, the so-called Thucydides trap serves as a warning.144  
Another historical analogy, however, is more pertinent. We see an 
established naval power bent on defending the status quo and invoking 
international law as justification. And we see a rising power which, resurfacing 
after an extended period of weakness—even humiliation—questions this very 
status quo. Parallels to the developments preceding World War I are evident, 
when the German Empire challenged British hegemony, particularly through its 
naval build-up. The impact of these similarities is not limited to the geopolitical 
situation, or the importance of navies and waterways. More importantly, these 
similarities also extend to the role played by international law.  
Since international law did not prevent the outbreak of World War I, it is 
often assumed to have been of marginal importance.145 This assumption 
overlooks two important aspects. First, the period before World War I witnessed 
important progress in the codification of international law. While international 
humanitarian law was of particular prominence in this regard,146 the 
institutionalization of the peaceful settlement of disputes also took great strides. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration was established in 1899;147 efforts to 
 
Arctic Sunrise case (in re Arctic Sunrise (Neth. v. Russ.) Case No. 2014-02 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015).  
143 Cf. Covenant of the League of Nations, 225 C.T.S. 195, Art. 21 (June 28, 1919). The U.S. already 
reserved the Monroe Doctrine for the 1899 Hague Conventions. Heinrich Pohl, Der Monroe-
Vorbehalt, in FESTGABE FÜR PAUL KRÜGER 447, 447-72 (1911). This is presumably the case for the 
1928 Briand-Kellog Pact as well. See CARL SCHMITT, VÖLKERRECHTLICHE GROSSRAUMORDNUNG 
MIT INTERVENTIONSVERBOT FÜR RAUMFREMDE MÄCHTE: EIN BEITRAG ZUM REICHSBEGRIFF IM 
VÖLKERRECHT 28 (1939). For Schmitt, the Monroe Doctrine provided the most eminent example for 
a "greater area with a mutual prohibition of intervention" (Großraum mit gegenseitigem 
Interventionsverbot). See also infra, IV.A. 
144 Small Reefs, Big Problems, ECONOMIST (July 25, 2015); Valencia, supra note 140; GRAHAM T. 
ALLISON, DESTINED FOR WAR: CAN AMERICA AND CHINA ESCAPE THUCYDIDES'S TRAP? (2017). 
The sense of inevitability of war that guided Athenian and Spartan decision-making processes is 
striking. See THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, bk. I, 23, 33 and 44 (Loeb 
Classical Library No. 108, 1962).  Evidence of such a sense is present today as well. See, e.g., 
Benjamin Haas, Steve Bannon: 'We're Going to War in the South China Sea ... no Doubt', THE 
GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-
trump-war-south-china-sea-no-doubt; Joshua Rovner, Two Kinds of Catastrophe: Nuclear 
Escalation and Protracted War in Asia, 40 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 696, 697 (2017). 
145See ISABEL V. HULL, A SCRAP OF PAPER: BREAKING AND MAKING INTERNATIONAL LAW DURING 
THE GREAT WAR 3 (2014) (providing a revision of the traditional view); Oliver Diggelmann, Beyond 
the Myth of a Non-relationship: International Law and World War, 19 J. HIST. INT’L. L. 93, 93-95 
(2017) (also questioning the traditional view). 
146 On the respective Hague Conventions of 1899 and1907, see Betsy Baker, Hague Peace 
Conferences (1899 and 1907), MPEPIL (2009). 
147 Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 187 C.T.S. 410 (July 29, 1899). 
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transform it into a truly permanent court with compulsory jurisdiction failed 
mainly due to German opposition. It is noteworthy that during negotiations, 
Germany had initially opposed any institutionalized arbitration as incompatible 
with State sovereignty, presaging Chinese refutation of any judicial 
proceedings.148  
Second, and more importantly, the defense of the international legal order 
was also a primary reason for the Allied Powers Britain and France  to enter the 
war in 1914. They considered themselves "engaged in the defence of 
international law and justice,"149 affirming "the sanctities of treaties" against the 
"dangerous challenge to the fundamental principles of public law" posed by 
Germany, which argued that international law had to cede to military necessity 
and national self-preservation.150 
Nor are the similarities limited to the role of international law. They also 
extend to the parameters of decision-making processes. In The Sleepwalkers, 
Christopher Clark described the "mental maps" that underlay the actions of 
Serbian decision-makers in July 1914.151 Such maps often deviate from 
geographical reality – on the Serbian mental map for instance, Bosnia-
Montenegro was part and parcel of Serbia.152 Similarly entrenched mental maps 
may be observed with regard to the South China Sea. Since 2012, Chinese 
passports have been embossed with the nine-dash line153 – suggesting that 
Chinese citizenship is now inherently linked to the belief that the South China 
Sea is part of China. In the same vein, the exam question "What is the 
southernmost point of China?" is common in Chinese schools.154 Students learn 
that this is James Shoal in the South China Sea: 107 km from the Malaysian 
coast, and 1500 km from Mainland China.155 Yet James Shoal is indeed a shoal 
 
148 J.P.A. François, La Cour permanente d’arbitrage: Son origine, sa jurisprudence, son avenir, 87 
RECUEIL DES COURS 461, 470 (1955). 
149 HULL, supra note 145, at 1 (citing Sir Graham Bower, a former British colonial official). 
150 See id. at notes 3&4 (reproducing the quotes); similarly, in 1917 President Wilson, in his message 
to Congress, stressed that German warfare violated the law of nations: Woodrow Wilson, Address 
delivered at Joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. S. Doc. No. 5, at 3 
(1917). Cf. also Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, 225 
C.T.S. 188, art. 227 (June 28, 1919) (providing for the arraignment of Emperor Wilhelm II “for a 
supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”). 
151 CHRISTOPHER CLARK, THE SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPE WENT TO WAR IN 1914, 20 et sqq. 
(Penguin Books 2013) (2012). See David Ley, Mental Maps / Cognitive Maps, in THE DICTIONARY 
OF HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, 455, 455 (Derek Gregory ed., 5th ed., 2009) (providing a general overview 
of the concept).  
152 CLARK, supra note 151, 34-35. 
153 Mark McDonald, A New Map in Chinese Passports Stirs Anger Across the Region, N.Y, IMES, 
(Nov. 25, 2012), https://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/a-map-in-chinas-new-passports-
stirs-anger/.  
154 Huang & Huang, supra note 37.  
155 Huang & Huang, supra note 37; HAYTON, supra note 18, at 116. 
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and lies 22 m below sea level―and its status as China’s southern vertex is based 
on a translation error from the 1930s.156 
III. 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 
In 1914, international law could not prevent the outbreak of the First World 
War. Is the international legal order of today more robust? Is the prohibition on 
the use of force sufficiently entrenched to prevent the outbreak of armed 
hostilities in the South China Sea on a large scale, the numerous parallels to the 
pre-World War I period notwithstanding? These should be questions of central 
importance to international legal scholarship—or so one would think. Yet the 
scholarly discourse rarely touches on such mundane matters. Instead, 
international law is often construed as a story of success and a narrative of 
continuous progress.157 Two examples―both pertinent to the South China 
Sea―illustrate this propensity: the posit of the gradual de-territorialization and 
the concept of an increasing constitutionalization of international law. Neither of 
these theories will be comprehensively expounded and evaluated here; they 
merely juxtapose the sometimes far-reaching claims made under these headings 
with the dispute in the South China Sea. 
A. De-territorialization 
For several years now, scholars have considered traditional, State-centered 
international law along Westphalian lines to be increasingly obsolete, or at least 
increasingly inadequate.158 In several areas, such developments may well apply 
to a certain degree. For instance, a "sense of de-territorialisation"159 is 
discernible in certain technological and economic areas: the internet is not 
bound to the physical sphere in the way that traditional means of communication 
once were. Even international humanitarian law, which tended to be closely 
related to territorial matters, now has to deal with more ephemeral means of 
attack.160 In commercial law, the liberalization of trade has also somewhat 
diminished the role of borders.161 The process of European unification has been 
considered a prominent example of continuous de-territorialization as well.162 
 
156 HAYTON, supra note 18, at 56. 
157 For a thoughtful analysis, see Tilmann Altwicker & Oliver Diggelmann, How is Progress 
Constructed in International Legal Scholarship? 25 EUR. J. INT’L. L.425, 425-44 (2014). 
158 See, e.g., Daniel Bethlehem, The End of Geography: The Changing Nature of the International 
System and the Challenge to International Law, 25 EUR. J. INT’L. L 9  (2014). 
159 Frédéric Mégret, Globalisation, MPEPIL para. 11 (2009). 
160 See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, War Crimes in Modern Warfare, 24 SWISS REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 206, 
225 (2014) (discussing computer network attacks). 
161 Jean-Philippe Robé, Multinational Enterprises: The Constitution of a Pluralistic Legal Order, in 
GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 46 (Gunther Teubner ed.,1997). 
162 See, e.g., Samantha Besson, Deliberative Demoi-cracy in the European Union: Towards the 
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Similar claims have been made in numerous other fields of international law, 
arguing that law is increasingly detached from territory.163  
As a result, it is argued that contemporary international law must not return 
“to a territorial order serving the interests of a group of States and of their 
elites,” but should instead “pursue a functional, global order, which, on the one 
hand, protects and promotes basic public goods and fundamental human values, 
on the other, accommodates constitutional pluralism and cultural diversity.”164 
This is certainly a laudable goal. It is, however, questionable whether these 
developments amount to a decline “of the role of territory as a parameter in 
international law,”165 or have resulted in a “crisis of the territory as a central 
concept in international law.”166 Even without applying a narrow realist 
perspective, the normative emergence of the prohibition of the use of force does 
not mean that international law no longer has to address the acquisition of 
territory by force.167 And even if international institutional regimes are 
proliferating, their effectiveness often remains too limited to make territoriality 
less relevant.168 "Drawing lines on the ground" may indeed not be the "ultimate 
response" to the challenges that an "ever-more interdependent humankind" is 
facing.169 The South China Sea dispute, however, is a potent portent that reports 
of the demise of territoriality in international law have been somewhat 
exaggerated.170 
 
Deterritorialization of Democracy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
181(Samantha Besson & José Luis Martí eds., 2006). 
163 A search for “de(-)territorialisation“ and “de(-)territorialization" yields 459 contributions on 
HeinOnline. Incidentally, the term does not originate in a philosophical context in the 1970s. Contra 
Catherine Brölmann, Deterritorialization in International Law: Moving Away from the Divide 
Between National and International Law, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 84, 90 n. 28 (Janne Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007)); its 
German equivalent (Entterritorialisierung) was already used by Carl Schmitt in a derogatory and 
strongly anti-Semitic context. See SCHMITT, supra note 143, at 12. 
164 Enrico Milano, The Deterritorialization of International Law, 2 ESIL REFLECTION (2013). 
165 Brölmann, supra note 163, at 84. 
166 Milano, supra note 164. 
167 See id. (“Pace Schmitt, territory is no more up for grabs in contemporary international law due to 
the emergence of peremptory norms, such as the prohibition to use force to acquire territory and the 
principle of self-determination.”). 
168 Cf. Brölmann, supra note 163, at 92 (naming global health monitoring by the WHO as an 
example); cf. also Bethlehem, supra note 158, at 2. But the prescriptive power of the WHO is 
limited. See Lorenz Langer, Impfung und Impfzwang zwischen persönlicher Freiheit und Schutz der 
öffentlichen Gesundheit, 136 I ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 87, 96 (2017). For a 
more cautious analysis of institutionalisation, see Andreas L. Paulus, From Territoriality to 
Functonality? Towards a Legal Methodology of Globalization, in GOVERNANCE AND 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 59, 75-88 (Ige F. Dekker & Wouther G. Werner eds., 2004). 
169 See Daniel-Erasmus Khan, Territory and Boundaries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170, 247 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012).  
170 It is rather ironic that China is now putting so much emphasis on clearly drawn lines. Clear-cut 
borderlines, just as insistence on territorial sovereignty, is a concept that China was forced to accept 
by imperial powers. Cf. The Green Borderlands: Treaties and Maps that Defined the Qing's 
Southwest Boundaries 23 (National Palace Museum ed., 2016), and on sovereignty Lorenz Langer, 
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Further, the law of the sea should have provided a powerful argument in 
favor of de-territorialization. The Third UN Conference on the Law of Sea was 
meant to collectivize and internationalize the sea, to establish a “common 
heritage of mankind” and to foster a sense of solidarity between developing and 
industrialized nations. The opposite has ensued. We observe an increasing 
“zonification,” with the corresponding drawing of lines. At the expense of the 
high sea, States claim sovereignty or sovereign rights over ever more maritime 
areas,171 and the result is a mare clausum rather than a mare liberum. The ten-
year period provided for extended continental shelf claims has led to a race for 
(underwater) territory;172 instead of an "end of geography," there is a relapse to 
an age when flags were once planted to mark territorial claims. This 
development is particularly stark in the Arctic, where the seabed is being 
territorialized as extensions of the respective coastal States,173 and where a 
Russian submarine planted a Russian flag on the ocean floor at the North Pole in 
2009.174 The Arctic should have been a prime example of the concept of a 
common heritage of mankind introduced by UNCLOS.175 Instead, the seabed is 
being appropriated by coastal States, and political considerations determine as a 
matter of course the fate of geographical features.176  
In the South China Sea, Chinese ships have repeatedly dropped 
"sovereignty steles" over James Shoal.177 In this region, we may even witness a 
“re-territorialization”: with highly detrimental consequences to the environment, 
large areas of land are being reclaimed.178 At the same time, territory also gains 
additional relevance through the apparent revival of exclusive spheres of 
interest. For the nine-dash line may also be understood as the proclamation of 
such a sphere—just as the United States did when adopting the Monroe Doctrine 
 
Out of Joint? - Hong Kong's International Status from the Sino-British Joint Declaration to the 
Present, 46 ARCHIV DES VÖLKERRECHTS 309, 313 n. 20 (2008). 
171 Talmon, supra note 106, at 465. National jurisdiction by coastal States now encompasses 
approximately 36% of the total seabed. See TANAKA, supra note 98, at 139.  
172 See supra note 20; Ted L. McDorman, The Continental Shelf, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF THE SEA 181, 197 et seq. (D. R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
173 The carving-up of the seabed is illustrated by the map prepared by the International Boundary 
Research Unit at Durham University, https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/resources/Arcticmap04-
08-15.pdf.  
174 MICHAEL BYERS & JAMES BAKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ARCTIC 92 (2013). Two years 
earlier, Canadian soldiers had planted a flag on Hans Island. 
175 Georg Witschel, New Chances and New Responsibilities in the Arctic Region: An Introduction, 
69 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 529, 530 (2009). 
176 Thus, Russia considers the Lomonosov Ridge close to the North Pole an extension of the 
“Russian” landmass. See BYERS & BAKER, supra note 175, at 107. Yet the extension below surface 
of the State established above surface is of course a fiction; the State is construed as a physical 
reality, immanent in the ground. 
177 Zheng Wang, The Nine-Dashed Line: 'Engraved in Our Hearts', THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 25, 2014), 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/the-nine-dashed-line-engraved-in-our-hearts/; HAYTON, supra note 
18, at 116. On the Shoal, see supra note 156. 
178 Supra note 25. 
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in 1823.179 At that time, the United States refused to tolerate European 
interference with its hegemonic relations to Latin America; today, China insists 
on bilateral negotiations with its South-East Asian neighbors from a position of 
strength. As a consequence, we might face a return to a Schmittian world with 
entrenched spheres of interests, rather than the hoped-for and bright future of de-
territorialized and universalist international law.180 
B. Constitutionalization 
The South China Sea gives rise to similar reservations with regard to the 
oft-invoked “constitutionalization” of international law.181 Again, this concept 
accurately reflects some important developments in international law. But has it 
become a dogma or credo, rather than a realistic description of actual 
developments? The transformative process of constitutionalization is supposed 
to result—or to have resulted—in an international order with constitutional 
characteristics, which include, inter alia, “rules on how laws ought to be made, 
how disputes ought to be settled, and which institutions shall exist, and […] the 
sort of basic values […] that no official action may encroach upon.”182 
Institutionalization and judicialization are held to be central aspects of such a 
development, accompanied by a “fundamental shift” in dispute settlement from 
the traditional consensual paradigm to a new compulsory paradigm, where 
ratification of a treaty implies acceptance of certain adjudication procedures.183 
Indeed, examples for such a shift abound, ranging from dispute settlement at the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), to the International Tribunal of the Law of 
the Sea, and most prominently, to the International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Another important facet of constitutionalization is the international 
protection of human rights and, as a corollary, a reassessment and, eventually, a 
 
179 See SCHMITT, supra note 143, at 23 et seq. 
180 Such a caveat is in order not only with regard to the South China Sea: even in the European 
Union, the refugee crisis of 2016 has led to national borders quickly re-emerging. 
181 See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters & 
Geir Ulfstein eds., 2009); Thomas Kleinlein, Konstitutionalisierung im Völkerrecht: Konstruktion 
und Elemente einer idealistischen Völkerrechtslehre (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht 
und Völkerrecht No. 231, 2012); SUPRASTAATLICHE KONSTITUTIONALISIERUNG: PERSPEKTIVEN 
AUF DIE LEGITIMITÄT, KOHÄRENZ UND EFFEKTIVITÄT DES VÖLKERRECHTS (Bardo Fassbender & 
Angelika Siehr eds., 2012). On the persisting lack of terminological accuracy in this context see 
Bardo Fassbender, 'We the Peoples of the United Nations': Constituent Power and Constitutional 
Form in International Law, THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 269, 276 (M. Loughlin ed., 2008) 
182 Jan Klabbers, Setting the Scene, THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 9 (Jan 
Klabbers et al. eds., 2009). 
183 Cesare P. R. Romano, The Shift from the Consensual to the Compulsory Paradigm in 
International Adjudication: Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y 791, 
794-95 (2007); see also Geir Ulfstein, Institutions and Competences, in THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 45-80 (Jan Klabbers et al. eds., 2009) (providing 
a discussion on institutionalisation). 
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restriction of traditional notions of sovereignty. This qualification of sovereignty 
is most obvious in the conceptualization of the Responsibility to Protect, which 
requires the international community to intervene in internal matters of States 
“when decisive action is required on human protection grounds.”184 Under such 
proposals, it would potentially be the Security Council’s “duty” to take action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to prevent genocide or massive crimes 
against humanity.185  
Scholars also argue, however, that the protection of human rights is not 
only an obligation of the international community; it is a precondition to be part 
of that community. According to such views, gross and manifest human rights 
violation lead to the “suspension” of the respective State’s sovereignty.186 
Sovereignty has “a legal value only to the extent that it respects human rights, 
interests, and needs,”187 and only States able and willing to protect their own 
citizens qualify as “legitimate and respected members of international 
society.”188 Underpinned by notions such as jus cogens, a “constitution of the 
international community” is construed,189 with community interests that differ from the 
egoistic interests of States.190 Eventually, and as an (ideal) vanishing point, 
under a Kantian perspective such a community would become a peoples’ State 
(Völkerstaat) or a world republic.191 
The conflict in the South China Sea offers a reality check, and a powerful 
antidote to overly optimistic claims. This is again illustrated by UNCLOS, the 
legal regime underlying the conflict. The Convention should have provided a 
persuasive example for the progressive constitutionalization of international law. 
At its adoption, the Convention was hailed as a “constitution for the oceans,” as 
a “monumental achievement of the international community, second only to the 
Charter of the United Nations.”192 The number of signatures on the first day may 
 
184 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT para. 2.27 (International Development Research Centre ed., 2001). 
185 See Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 513, 539 (2009); 
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187 Peters, supra note 185, at 513–14. 
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GLOBAL RESPOSIBILITY TO PROTECT 353, 354 (2010). 
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190 Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The 'International Community': Facing the Challenge of 
Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 266, 266–77 (1998). 
191 8 IMMANUEL KANT, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, in KANT'S GESAMMELTE 
SCHRIFTEN, 341, 360 (Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften ed., 1912) (1795). Cf. 
Jürgen Habermas, Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch eine Chance, in DER 
GESPALTENE WESTEN 113–94 (2004). 
192 Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Statement by the President, 11th Sess., 
185th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.185, ¶ 52 (Dec. 6, 1982), and Closing Statement by the 
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have been "a new record in juridical history.”193 However, as set out above, the 
simmering disagreement between developing and industrialized nations resulted 
in the emergence of separate regimes and, after the 1994 Agreement, in the 
segmentation and appropriation of large swathes of the high sea.194 With regard 
to institutionalization, UNCLOS established several new bodies: the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the International Seabed 
Authority, and ITLOS, which was to play an important role in compulsory 
dispute settlement. Therefore, UNCLOS should also have entrenched important 
advances in the judicialization of the law of the sea. Part XV and Annexes VII 
and VIII of the Convention contain detailed rules for judicial and arbitral dispute 
settlement. In some cases, these mechanisms have indeed offered solutions to 
complex conflicts.195 However, as the South China Sea arbitration illustrates, not 
every new convention or institution is tantamount to an increase in effective 
international governance. 
The aftermath of the arbitral Award, as set out above, should also caution 
against too far-reaching claims of an international community united by shared 
values. Instead of a relativization of sovereignty, we see its absolutization. After 
the adoption of the Award, China has declared sovereignty a red line, and 
reiterated that the South China Sea was a "core interest" of its sovereignty,196 a 
sovereignty that is presumably not contingent on respect for human rights or 
other community values such as ecological responsibility.197 China's refusal to 
participate in the proceedings weakens institutionalized dispute-settlement. Nor 
is it an isolated case. The ICC, which has been identified as a pivotal element of 
a "truly public international order,"198 has also experienced several setbacks. 
Gambia may have rescinded its withdrawal from the Court, but Burundi has left 
the Rome Statute and South Africa is still intent on doing so.199  
 
President, 11th Sess., 185th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/SR.193 ¶ 46 (Dec. 10, 1982).; see also 
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(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014). 
196 State Councilor's Interview on the So-called Award by the Arbitral Tribunal for South China Sea 
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This indicates that international dispute settlement is still not by definition 
peaceful. Powerful States can afford to ignore the judgements of international 
tribunals with little consequence, indifferent to the damage that their 
international reputation allegedly suffers. In particular, the constitutionalization 
of international law reaches its factual limit as soon as a permanent member of 
the Security Council is involved, even in times when the Responsibility to 
Protect is touted as an established principle. What exactly does it mean, for 
instance, when the veto of a permanent Security Council member is considered 
“illegal” or an “abus de droit”?200 Several vetoes in the context of the Syrian 
civil war might thus be considered illegal, yet they nevertheless precluded any 
action endorsed by the Security Council and hence in conformity with the UN 
Charter.201 While it may well be that such inaction entails international 
responsibility either of the UN or a Security Council Member State, it is difficult 
to conceive of circumstances where such a responsibility could be successfully 
enforced.202 
As part of an idealistic discourse or an argument de lege ferenda, postulates 
of constitutionalization and communitarization do play an important role in 
international legal scholarship. For such scholarship should be more than mere 
positivism and must not be limited to an anodyne restatement of the lex lata—it 
should also point the way to a better future. But at the same time, it has to be 
more than a discursive exercise.203 The prolific postulation of "emerging" rules 
or rights should not be mistaken for a description of the lex lata.204 Auspicious 
yet adumbrated trends leading to a brighter tomorrow have to be clearly 
distinguished from the effectively enforced or protected rules and rights of 
today. Perhaps due to a lingering urge for self-justification, international legal 
scholars tend to oversell such trends as facts.205 But if "almost anything is 
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presented as 'progress'", it is indeed the "system of international law that will 
become the loser."206  
Academic discourse is becoming increasingly detached from legal 
practice,207 to the extent that the output of international legal scholarship is 
considered by practitioners "not terribly helpful.”208 Naturally, legal scholars are 
more than the handmaidens of practicing lawyers.209 International legal 
scholarship should indeed be an “engaged constructor of social reality.”210 
Nevertheless, it still needs to be grounded in a reality that is not experienced 
exclusively by a small circle of the initiated. Otherwise, our discipline will 
become an esoteric or even eschatological enterprise. 
IV. 
LAST BUT NOT LEAST: THE ROLE OF LEGAL SCHOLARS – CALLING THE TUNE? 
If developments in the South China Sea ought to dampen overly ambitious 
scholarly claims about the progress of international law, they should also serve 
as a reminder of the role that legal scholars play in such disputes. In the previous 
Part, I referred to the tension between international legal scholarship and 
international legal practice. In international law in particular, this tension exists 
not only in an interpersonal, but also in an intrapersonal way. In her study on the 
role of legal thinkers and practitioners, Anne Peters interviewed 17 eminent 
international law practitioners. Combined, these 17 individuals concurrently 
exercised 45 functions, such as legal adviser, counsel, arbitrators, judges and, 
predominantly, academic teachers.211 Obviously, these different roles might 
influence each other: a counsel for a government is unlikely to publish an 
academic paper undermining his client's position. But to what extent may 
scholarship be instrumentalized to further the principal's cause?  
One notable aspect of the academic fall-out of the Hague arbitral Award 
has been the clear partisanship of commentators. This is particularly evident 
with regard to the Chinese side. I have not found a single contribution by a 
Chinese scholar working in China that is critical of the PRC's position. Although 
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the arbitral Award has evidently been scrutinized with great care,212 for Chinese 
scholars, the motto apparently has to be: my country, right or wrong, my 
country.213 It has been suggested that the boycott of the proceedings in The 
Hague might, in part, have been due to a lack of confidence in China’s 
autochthonous legal expertise.214 Be that as it may, it is hardly a coincidence that 
the Chinese leadership in 2014 decided that the PRC should “vigorously 
participate in the formulation of international norms and strengthen our 
country’s discourse power and influence in international legal affairs, and use 
legal methods to safeguard our country’s sovereignty, security and development 
interests.”215 This refers to government strategy, but it also includes academic 
discourse: there has been a significant push to strengthen China's practical as 
well as its academic international law capacities.216 One example for this two-
pronged approach is provided by the Xiamen Academy of International Law, 
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(Updated), OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 20, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/11/20/chinas-icj-judge-xue-
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in the audience.” She was responding to a paper that Harry Roque, a Philippine law professor, had 
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http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/opinion/content/336686/a-judge-from-china-speaks-up-on-our-
arbitral-claim-on-the-west-philippine-sea/story/. 
214 Sonya Sceats, China's Fury Over South China Sea Belies Its Legal Insecurities, CHATHAM 
HOUSE, (July 4, 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/chinas-fury-over-south-
china-sea-belies-its-legal-insecurities. 
215 Decision Concerning Some Major Questions in Comprehensively Moving Governing the Country 
According to the Law Forward, CCP Central Committee, (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/10/28/ccp-central-committee-decision-
concerning-some-major-questions-in-comprehensively-moving-governing-the-country-according-to-
the-law-forward/. While the party aims to “foster rule of law talents and reserve forces who are well 
acquainted with and persist in the Socialist rule of law system with Chinese characteristics,” it also 
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which aims for its summer programs “to be both practical and highly 
scholarly.”217 For the time being, such efforts rely to a considerable degree on 
extrinsic expertise.218 However, the younger generation of Chinese international 
lawyers is increasingly expected “to develop distinctively Chinese theories of 
international law.”219 
Such ambitions are to be welcomed if they result in a broadening of legal 
discourse and the inclusion of new perspectives. However, given the multitude 
of roles of legal experts and given the prominent role that such experts play in 
international law,220 it is also important that certain rules are observed so that 
scholarship can provide added value beyond mere partisanship. Western 
scholars promote views that serve their clients as well, and it is also fairly 
common for scholarly publication to render such views. But if a forum is 
provided for partisan scholarship, transparency is of central importance, as is the 
principle audiatur et altera pars.221 An example for such even-handedness is 
provided by the Agora on the South China Sea in the American Journal of 
International Law in 2013.222 Issue 2/2016 of the Chinese Journal of 
International Law, on the other hand, dealt with the jurisdiction of the arbitral 
tribunal in The Hague, yet contained only contributions supporting China's 
position,223 including, for good measure, the PRC Government position paper 
 
217  See About Us: Introduction, XIANACADEMY.ORG, http://www.xiamenacademy.org/aboutus.aspx 
?BaseInfoCateId=75&CateID=75&CurrCateID=75&showCateID=75. 
218 While the Academy’s Administrative Council consists exclusively of Chinese scholars, as of 
summer 2018, non-Chinese members constitute a majority on its Curatorium. About Us: 
Curatorium, XIANACADEMY.ORG, 
http://www.xiamenacademy.org/aboutus.aspx?BaseInfoCateId=76&CateID=76&CurrCateID=76&s
howCateID=76.  
219 This challenge was reportedly issued by the late Wang Tieya at the first meeting of the Chinese 
Society of International Law. See Roundtable Meeting Summary: Exploring Public International 
Law and the Rights of Individuals with Chinese Scholars, CHATHAM HOUSE, 3 (April 14-17, 2014), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/field/field_document/20140414PublicInternational
LawChina.pdf. In this context, it is worth noting that after reaching 50% in 2011, the percentage of 
Chinese professors teaching at the Xiamen Academy has significantly decreased in recent years 
(with no Chinese teaching in 2012 and 2016). Professors, Xianacademy.org, 
http://www.xiamenacademy.org/products.aspx. 
220 See Oliver Diggelmann, Anmerkungen zu den Unschärfen des völkerrechtlichen Rechtsbegriffs, 
26 SWISS REV. INT’L. & EUR. L. 381, 384 (2016). 
221 Cf. COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATION ETHICS, CODE OF CONDUCT AND BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES 
FOR JOURNAL EDITORS Addendum 1 (2013) (2011), 
https://publicationethics.org/files/Code%20of%20Conduct_2.pdf (observing that the content of 
academic journals “should not be determined by the policies of governments.”). 
222 See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: The South China Sea: Editors' 
Introduction, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 95, 95–97 (2013); Zhiguo Gao & Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash 
Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 98, 98–124 
(2013); Florian Dupuy & Pierre-Marie Dupuy, A Legal Analysis of China's Historic Rights Claim in 
the South China Sea, 107 AM. J. INT’L. L. 124, 124–41 (2013). 
223 See Yee, supra note 31; Chris Whomersley, The South China Sea: The Award of the Tribunal in 
the Case Brought by Philippines against China: A Critique, 15 CHIN. J. INT’L. L. 219, 239–64 
(2016); Sreenivasa Rao Pemmaraju, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): 
BJIL_36-3_ARTICLE 2_LANGER  
2018] SOUTH CHINA SEA 415 
and a statement by the Chinese Society of International Law.224 Other academic 
publications, though purportedly published only “to serve the administration of 
justice and to strengthen the rule of law,”225 were of a similarly one-sided nature. 
Such publications apparently served as a surrogate, compensating for China's 
non-appearance in The Hague and aiming to disseminate the Chinese point of 
view.226 
In international disputes, it is a time-honored task of international lawyers 
to represent the interest of one party. One of the foundational texts of the law of 
the sea, Hugo Grotius' Mare liberum, was written on behalf of the Dutch East 
India Company and exclusively served to push its agenda.227 Partisanship, 
however, should be openly declared, particularly if based on a government 
mandate and professed by academics who teach and conduct research at public 
universities.228 Otherwise, the academy risks being (ab)used, willingly or 
unwillingly, for government policy. As with numerous aspects of the South 
China Sea dispute, there is also a historical precedent for such developments: in 
the post-World War I period, German legal scholarship was systematically 
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instrumentalized by the German Foreign Ministry, or Auswärtiges Amt, to 
criticize the Versailles Treaty regime.229 
CONCLUSION 
It is a long way from Times Square to the South China Sea. But the short 
propaganda clip displayed in Manhattan in 2016 illustrates that this regional 
conflict over some small islands has worldwide repercussions. It also shows that 
the international legal order is still struggling to assert itself when challenged by 
a major power. The Award in the South China Sea Arbitration was carefully 
worded and extensively argued. It prompted strong Chinese reactions, yet it is 
unlikely to be implemented any time soon.  
If considered from a meta-perspective, however, the arbitration yields 
important insights on the state both of the law of the sea and of international law 
more generally. A short overview of Chinese and U.S. reactions shows that both 
powers invoke international law to bolster their mutually exclusive positions. 
These differences mirror the development of the law of the sea. Historically, the 
Western sea-faring nations have, since Grotius' mare liberum, pushed for a 
liberal regime of the sea, but just as that seminal text was meant to further Dutch 
trade interests, so did the concept of the freedom of the sea serve primarily its 
Western proponents. By contrast, the second half of the 20th century has seen a 
proliferation of sovereign rights over certain zones of the sea, and extensive 
State claims to these zones. The 2016 Award shows that there are limits to such 
rights and claims, but also that these limits may not be universally accepted. As 
a result, political and military tensions in the Asian-Pacific region are rising. 
Historical parallels between the early 20th century and the rise of China and 
its challenge to the hegemonic position of the United States have been drawn 
before. However, these parallels are not limited to political or military aspects. 
The period before World War I saw significant progress in the codification of 
international law and in the institutionalization of dispute settlement. And yet, 
war broke out. When it did, the Allied Powers named the defense of 
international law as one of the main purposes of their fight. Today, the arbitral 
proceedings provided for by UNCLOS have not led to a peaceful settlement, and 
the United States similarly insists that its presence in the South China Sea aims 
to protect the freedom of the sea, and international law more broadly. 
These developments should give the scholarly community pause. That 
community has construed the development of international law as steady 
progress towards an increasingly institutionalized and judicialized normative 
order with constitutional characteristics, in which once-omnipresent 
considerations of territoriality are slightly démodé. Such a grand narrative is an 
important element of international legal scholarship. Mere descriptive analysis 
of a somewhat somber present does not further a peaceful international 
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community, which is the goal that international law is meant to serve. That goal, 
however, is not furthered by disregarding the considerable challenges posed by 
trouble spots such as the South China Sea, or by considering such challenges 
mere temporary distractions from a near-perfect world republic. 
The so-called "Chinese curse" aims to condemn its victims "to live in 
interesting times."230 Today's international lawyers live in interesting times 
indeed. Transnational legal regimes are spreading, and more and more aspects of 
our individual lives are affected by international law. At the same time, the 
fundamental tenets of international law—its binding nature, its ability to protect 
peace and enable the enjoyment of basic rights—keep being questioned. This 
tension should not be brushed over or covered up with well-intentioned utopias. 
It poses a challenge that should be acknowledged––and accepted. 
 
  
 
230 There is no Chinese equivalent for this “curse.” Fittingly for our context, it seems to be a Western 
expression, apocryphally ascribed to the Chinese. See Fred R. Shapiro, THE YALE BOOK OF 
QUOTATIONS 669 (2006).  
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